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Abstract—The emergence of heterogeneous decentralized net-
works without a central controller, such as device-to-device
communication systems, has created the need for new problem
frameworks to design and analyze the performance of such
networks. As a key step towards such an analysis for general
networks, this paper examines the strategic behavior of receivers
in a Gaussian broadcast channel (BC) and transmitters in a
multiple access channel (MAC) with sum power constraints (sum
power MAC) using the framework of non-cooperative game the-
ory. These signaling scenarios are modeled as generalized Nash
equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with jointly convex and coupled
constraints and the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
achieving strategies and equilibrium utilities are characterized for
both the Gaussian BC and the sum power MAC. The relationship
between Pareto-optimal boundary points of the capacity region
and the generalized Nash equilibria (GNEs) are derived for the
several special cases and in all these cases it is shown that all
the GNEs are Pareto-optimal, demonstrating that there is no
loss in efficiency when players adopt strategic behavior in these
scenarios. Several key equivalence relations are derived and used
to demonstrate a game-theoretic duality between the Gaussian
MAC and the Gaussian BC. This duality allows a parametrized
computation of the equilibria of the BC in terms of the equilibria
of the MAC and paves the way to translate several MAC results
to the dual BC scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several wireless and cellular networks currently in operation
are centrally controlled by an operator who is assumed to know
the state of the network and operate it in an optimal fashion
to maximize throughput and minimize interference in a fair
and efficient manner. However, due to the recent emergence
of heterogeneous and decentralized wireless networks, such
as device-to-device communication systems, in which several
nodes are owned by different operators, it can no longer
be assumed that there exists a central controller which can
optimize the performance of a network as a whole. Thus new
problem frameworks are needed to both design and analyze the
performance of such networks. In recent literature, game the-
ory has been used extensively to model, understand and drive
the interactions between nodes in heterogeneous networks
which act to optimize their own individual objectives. For
example, several aspects of the multiple access channel (MAC)
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and the interference channel (IC) have been extensively studied
using non-cooperative game theory (see [1], [2] for a detailed
survey).
In a typical non-cooperative game, the choice of actions of
a player affects the utility obtained by every player, but does
not change the set of available actions for other players. For
example, the Gaussian MAC, the Gaussian IC and its variants
belong to this category of games [3]–[6]. However, in some
scenarios, such as the Gaussian broadcast channel (BC), in
which the receivers can be considered the players in a game,
the choice of actions of all the players is jointly constrained
by a transmit power or covariance constraint as the choice of a
transmit covariance matrix for one receiver will constrain the
choice of transmit covariance matrices for the other receivers.
In [7], the problem of maintaining a minimum rate over
parallel Gaussian ICs, subject to a sum power constraint for
each user, is considered. The choice of power allocation of a
player for a given channel is then influenced by the choice
of power allocation of other players on other interference
channels to maintain an overall desired rate and hence is also
a game with coupled constraints on the strategies of adopted
by the players. Such joint constraints on the strategies of the
players result in the feasible set of each player being a function
of the choice of strategies of the other players. Interaction of
players at the level of feasible sets makes the analysis of such
games more challenging than standard non-cooperative games.
The problem of determining the equilibria of games with
coupled constraints is called a generalized Nash equilibrium
problem (GNEP) [1], [7], [8] and the points themselves are
called generalized Nash equilibria (GNE).
From a game theoretic perspective, the BC and its related
problems have received little attention relative to other chan-
nels such as the MAC and the IC. A discrete memoryless BC
with 2 users and a resource manager was considered in [9]
and the impact of the information available to the resource
manager in modifying the utility of each user is studied. Our
previous work [10] considered the device-to-device cooper-
ation problem for the uplink with perfect cooperation and
examined the stability of the grand coalition of transmitters in
a MAC. The work in [11] proposes a framework for macrocell-
femtocell cooperation to delegate transmission in which the
femtocell acts as a relay for the macro cell and considers
coalition formation for this scenario. In [12], interference
aware resource allocation for device-to-device communication
2is considered and a sequential second price auction is proposed
for sharing the spectrum and a mode selection algorithm for
communication based on coalitional games is proposed in
[13]. Several works in the literature has used game theory as
an effective tool to study various aspects of device-to-device
cooperation. However, we observe there is a significant need
to introduce new game theoretic models to analyze complex
networks. To this end, we introduce a game theoretic model
for the BC which enables the study of downlink cooperation
with rational and selfish players. Such a model could also
pave the way for analysis of cognitive radio scenarios in
which the primary and multiple secondary users can operate
simultaneously on the same spectrum [14].
In this paper, we propose to use the framework of games
with coupled constraints to characterize the equilibria of the
MIMO Gaussian BC and the MIMO Gaussian sum power
MAC. Our goal in this paper is to analyze the Gaussian
BC and sum power MAC from a game-theoretic perspective
and interpret several achievable rates/capacity results [15] for
the BC in this framework. Our work shows the existence
of GNEs for the general Gaussian BC and characterizes the
uniqueness of equilibrium utilities for the general case and
equilibrium achieving strategies for a special class of BCs
termed aligned and degraded broadcast channels (ADBCs)
[15]. We then consider the MIMO MAC with sum power
constraints (henceforth called the sum power MAC). The sum
power MAC is a problem that is closely related to the BC by an
information-theoretic duality and [16] shows that the capacity
region for the sum power MAC is the same as the capacity
region for an equivalently defined BC. We characterize the
existence and uniqueness of equilibria for the sum power MAC
and show that while the utility at equilibrium, given a decoding
order, is the same for all the players, the equilibrium achieving
strategies may not necessarily be unique. By deriving a relation
between Pareto-optimal points and equilibrium rates we show
that every rate point on the Pareto-optimal boundary of the
BC and the sum power MAC is an equilibrium rate point.
In information theory, owing to the structure of the MIMO
BC, associated optimization problems such as capacity re-
gion computation and beamforming optimization are typically
highly non-convex problems and cannot be solved directly.
One feasible approach that has proved effective in the literature
is to transform the non-convex BC problems into a convex
dual MAC problem, which is easier to deal with and then
transform the solution back into the domain of the BC [16]
(see [17] for a comprehensive survey on the general duality
between MAC and BC with possibly multiple constraints).
The conventional information theoretic duality between the
BC and the MAC has been established for several scenarios
and has been used to solve several problems of interest to the
wireless community. In this paper, we derive a game-theoretic
duality between the MAC and the BC. We first develop several
equivalence relations between Nash equilibria (NE) of a class
of Nash equilibrium problems (NEP) related to the MAC and
GNEPs related to the sum power MAC and the BC and then
demonstrate a game-theoretic duality between the MAC and
the BC. On the lines of the information theoretic duality for
the sum power MAC and BC, the game theoretic duality states
that every equilibrium point of the BC can be transformed into
equilibrium points of the sum power MAC and vice versa.
The duality provides us a method to parametrically obtain the
GNEs of the BC by solving the NE of the dual MAC and then
transform the solution to the BC using [16]. In general, the
duality will enable the analysis of BC games by considering
equivalent MAC games and allow us to translate key results
from the MAC to the BC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces several concepts related to GNEPs and describes
various ways of analyzing GNEPs. In addition, Section II de-
rives the condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium achieving
strategies for a parameterized GNEP characterization. Using
the results in Section II, the existence and uniqueness of
equilibria for the BC and the sum power MAC are analyzed
in Section III and Section IV respectively. The relationship
between Pareto-optimal solutions and equilibria is derived in
Section V and the correspondence between the two solutions
is discussed with applicability to both the sum power MAC
and the BC. Section VI derives several equivalence relations
between the MAC and the BC and then shows the existence of
a game theoretic duality between the two channels and Section
VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by reviewing several game theoretic concepts
for GNEPs. We first introduce the GNEP formulation, the
concepts of generalized and normalized equilibria and discuss
the relationship between them. Using the formulation in [8],
we then derive a sufficient condition for the existence and
uniqueness of normalized equilibria for GNEPs.
A. Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
Formally, a GNEP consists of K players with each player
controlling the variable Qk. We denote by Q, the vector
formed by all these decision variables Q = (Q1, Q2, ..., QK),
and by Q−k the vector formed by the decision variables of
all other players except the kth player. Each player has an
objective function vk that depends on both his own variables
Qk and the controlling variables of all other players Q−k.
This function is called the utility function of the kth player
and is formally denoted as vk(Qk, Q−k) or vk(Q), Q =
(Q1, Q2, ..., QK) to emphasize the dependence on the control-
ling variables. Furthermore, each player’s action must belong
to a set Ak(Q−k) that depends on the rival players’ actions
and that we call the feasible set or action space of player
k. We emphasize that the set Ak(Q−k) is a function of the
strategies of the other players. The aim of the kth player, given
the actions of all the other players Q−k, is to pick a strategy
that solves the maximization problem
max
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k) subject to Qk ∈ Ak(Q−k). (1)
Let Ψk(Q−k) denote the set of all the solutions to the kth
player’s maximization problem given Q−k. The GNEP is the
problem of finding Q∗k such that
Q∗k ∈ Ψ(Q∗−k) for all k = 1, 2, ...,K.
3Such as point is called a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)
or more generally a solution to the GNEP. A point Q∗
is therefore an equilibrium, if no player can improve this
objective function by changing unilaterally to any other point
in his feasible set. If we denote by Ψ(Q) the set Ψ(Q) :=
×Ki=1Ψi(Q−i) we see that Q∗ is a GNE if and only if
Q∗ ∈ Ψ(Q∗), i.e., if and only if Q∗ is a fixed point of the
mapping Ψ. If the feasible set of each player is independent
of the actions adopted by all the other players, then the GNEP
reduces to the well known Nash equilibrium problem.
In a GNEP, the kth player must know the strategy of the
other players to determine his own feasible set, however the
other players need to know the strategy of the kth player
to determine their own strategy. Thus there is a practical
challenge of a game where the players make their choices
simultaneously and it happens that the consraints are satisfied.
However, this view of GNEPs is limited as observed in [18]
and undervalues the (1) descriptive power of the GNEP model
and (2) possibility of using GNEPs to develop rules and
protocols, set taxes etc. in order to achieve performance goals
(see [18] for a detailed discussion).
Remark: We note that GNEPs have sometimes been used
in a normative way in the literature. No one is really playing
a game; rather a single decision maker establishes that the
outcome of a GNEP is desirable and therefore implements
this solution. However, adopting a pricing and penalty based
approach (discussed later in this section) to solving GNEPs
has been successfully adopted in several works: the power
allocation a problem in a Gaussian interference channel [7],
design for cognitive radio systems with interference constraints
[19] etc.
A GNEP usually has multiple or, in many cases, uncount-
ably many equilibria [8], [18]. While characterizing the GNEs
for a general GNEP has proven to be a challenging problem
in general, special classes of GNEPs, such as jointly convex
scenarios, have been examined in literature and are briefly
illustrated below [8].
Definition 1: A GNEP is said to be concave (convex)
if for every player k and every Q−k, the utility function
vk(Qk, Q−k) is concave (convex) and the set Ψk(Q−k) is
closed and convex.
Definition 2: A GNEP is said to be jointly convex if the
GNEP is concave (convex) and for some closed set Q and all
k = 1, 2, ...,K , we have
Ψk(Q−k) = {Qk|(Qk, Q−k) ∈ Q} . (2)
This class of problems was first studied in detail in a seminal
paper by Rosen [8] and has been referred to as GNEPs
with coupled constraints or in general jointly convex GNEPs.
From [18], we know that if the sets Ψk(Q−k) are defined
by a system of inequalities, then there exists a function h(Q)
which is component-wise convex with respect to Qk for all
k = 1, 2, ...,K and furthermore Q = {Q|hj(Q) ≥ 0, ∀j}. In
other words, jointly convex GNEPs are characterized by the
fact that all the players have the same common constraints.
Rosen [8] allows for a discriminatory treatment of players
through the introduction of weights ri > 0, i = 1, 2, ...,K
with which the enforcer of the joint constraint can value each
player’s payoff. The main role of the weights in controlling the
player’s behavior is that they modify the Karush-Kuhn Tucker
(KKT) multipliers of each player’s utility maximization and
entice the players to choose actions that lead to a desirable
equilibrium outcome (among the infinitely many possible).
B. Characterization of jointly convex GNEPs
We first define the normalized equilibria (NoE) of a jointly
convex GNEP and then explore the relationship between GNEs
and NoEs for this class of GNEPs. Consider the weighted
utility function
f(B,Q, r) =
K∑
i=1
rivi(Q1, ..., Qi−1, Bi, Qi+1, ..., QK), (3)
for a fixed vector of positive weights r = (r1, r2, ..., rK).
The K-tuple Q∗ = (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗K) is a normalized equilibrium
(NoE) with respect to the weights r, if Q∗ satisfies the fixed
point condition
Q∗ = argmax
B
f(B,Q∗, r), (4)
Let hj(Q1, Q2, ..., QK) ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., J denote the set of
joint constraints that each player must satisfy in addition to
individual constraints on his control variables. Then, Q∗ is an
NoE if and only if it satisfies the following KKT conditions:
rk∇kvk(Q∗k, Q∗−k) +
J∑
j=1
λ∗kj∇khj(Q∗) = 0,
λ∗kj ≥ 0, hj(Q∗) ≥ 0, λ∗kjhj(Q∗) = 0, ∀ k, (5)
where ∇k is the derivative w.r.t Qk and λkj are the Lagrange
multipliers. The parameters λkj are called the shadow prices
of the joint constraints. For a general GNE, the Lagrange
multipliers are unrelated to each other. The NoEs of the GNEP
are a subset of GNEs for which the shadow prices of each of
the joint constraints are equal for all players.
Definition 3: A given GNE of a GNEP is an NoE if and
only if λkj = λj for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K , i.e., the shadow
prices of each constraint are equal for each player.
For an NoE, the parameter λjri is defined as the real price
for satisfying the jth constraint by the kth player. We next
characterize the role of the weight vector r. If the weight of
the kth player rk is greater than that of his competitors, then
his real price is reduced and the marginal cost for constraint
violation is lower than a player with higher weight. In other
words, the choice of the vector renables the decision maker
to decide how the burden of constraint satisfaction is to be
divided among all the players in a GNEP.
Proposition 1: The set of GNEs and NoEs is identical for
a GNEP with only one jointly convex constraint.
Proof: For a GNEP with only one jointly coupled con-
straint, the KKT conditions at a given GNE satisfy
rk∇kvk(Q∗k, Q∗−k) + λ∗k1∇kh1(Q∗) = 0,
λ∗k1 ≥ 0, hj(Q∗) ≥ 0, λ∗k1h1(Q∗) = 0, ∀ k. (6)
We observe that this GNE can be considered an NoE for the
above problem for the modified weight vector ( r1λ11 , · · · , rKλK1 )
4with unit Lagrange multipliers for the constraints. Thus we
observe that the set of GNEs for this problem is a subset
of NoEs. From the definition of NoEs, we know that the set
of NoEs is a subset of the set of GNEs of a GNEP. This
transformation between the GNEs and NoEs shows that the
set of NoEs for a GNEP with one jointly convex constraint
is identical to the set of GNEs. However, this can not be said
about GNEPs with more than one jointly convex constraint.
Note: In this paper, we consider the MIMO BC and MIMO
sum power MAC with only one joint sum power constraint
and hence the set of NoEs and GNEs are identical for our
problem.
Once the decision maker of a jointly convex GNEP has
established a desired NoE, the equilibrium implementation of
the problem is as follows. The real prices associated with the
joint constraints are used as penalty tax rates for constraint
violation and the players have to allow for penalties in their
payoffs. Define the penalty function:
Tk(λ
∗, rk, Q1, ..., QK) =
J∑
j=1
λ∗j
rk
max(0,−hj(Q1, ..., QK)),
(7)
where λ∗j is the (equal for all players) Lagrange multiplier
associated with the jth common constraint, rk the weight of
the kth player that defines the responsibility for constraint
satisfaction. Clearly, a player with a large weight has a smaller
penalty for violating the common constraint while a player
with smaller weight suffers a larger penalty. If the constraint
is perfectly satisfied, then the penalty is zero for all the players.
Now, using the penalty function Tk, we define a game with
modified utility functions which take into account the penalty
for common constraint violation.
v˜k(Qk, Q−k) = vk(Qk, Q−k)− Tk(λ∗, rk, Q1, ..., QK). (8)
Each player now needs to satisfy only his individual con-
straints and thus with the modified utility function, the problem
becomes a traditional Nash equilibrium problem with decou-
pled constraints. From [20], we know that the Nash equilibria
for the modified utility functions are the same as the NoEs of
the original problem with jointly convex constraints.
C. Uniqueness of NoEs
We first define several terms which help us in deriving a
sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NoEs for a GNEP.
Let
σ(Q, r) =
K∑
i=1
rivi(Qi, Q−i), ri > 0, (9)
to be the weighted sum of the utilities of each player, where
Q are the control variables for all the players and r is a vector
containing a set of positive weights.
Definition 4: [8] The function
g(Q, r) =


r1∇1v1(Q1, Q−1)
r2∇2v2(Q2, Q−2)
.
.
.
rK∇KvK(Qk, Q−k)

 , (10)
where ∇i is the derivative w.r.t the ith players’control vari-
ables is called the pseudo-gradient of σ(Q, r).
Definition 5: (defined for scalar variables in [8]) The func-
tion σ(Q, r) is called diagonally strictly concave (DSC) in
matrix valued strategies for a fixed r > 0, if for every
Q˜, Qˆ ∈ Q, we have that
Tr
[
(Q˜− Qˆ)T g(Qˆ, r) + (Qˆ − Q˜)T g(Q˜, r)
]
> 0. (11)
Proposition 2: If the utility functions of a jointly convex
GNEP satisfy the DSC condition for any given r, then the
GNEP has a unique NoE for that given value of r.
The proof of this proposition depends on the nature of the
jointly convex constraints, in general. To simplify the presen-
tation and illustrate the key ideas in the proof, we consider
a constraint of the form
∑K
i=1 Tr[Qi] ≤ Ptot. We note that
this proof technique can be directly applied to problems with
multiple and heterogeneous constraints.
Proof: We assume that there exist multiple NoEs for the
given weight vector r and then arrive at a contradition to show
the DSC property ensures uniqueness of NoEs. Let us assume
that Q˜ = (Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K) and Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK) be two
K-tuples of covariance matrices which are NoEs to the game
characterized by the weight vector r. We know from (4) that
Q˜ = argmax
B
f(B, Q˜, r) and Qˆ = argmax
B
f(B, Qˆ, r). (12)
Writing the Lagrangian for the maximization of the weighted
utility function, we get
L = f(B,Q, r) + λ(
K∑
i=1
Tr[Qi]− Ptot) +
K∑
i=1
Tr[LiQi] (13)
Writing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [21] for
the two equilibria yields:
(a) Q˜i, Qˆi  0, i = 1, 2, ...,K
(b) ∑Ki=1 Tr[Q˜i] ≤ Ptot and ∑Ki=1 Tr[Qˆi] ≤ Ptot.
(c) Tr[L˜iQ˜i] = 0 and Tr[LˆiQˆi] = 0.
(d) λ˜
(∑K
i=1 Tr[Q˜i]− Ptot
)
= 0.
(e) λˆ
(∑K
i=1 Tr[Qˆi]− Ptot
)
= 0.
(f) ri∇ivi(Q˜) + L˜i − λ˜I = 0
(g) ri∇ivi(Qˆ) + Lˆi − λˆI = 0.
where λ˜, λˆ ≥ 0 and L˜i, Lˆi  0 are the Lagrange multipliers
associated with sum power constraint and the positive semi-
definiteness of the solutions respectively. Now multiplying (f)
and (g) with (Qˆi − Q˜i) and (Q˜i − Qˆi) respectively, summing
on i and taking the trace we get
0 =
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
(Qˆi − Q˜i)(ri∇ivi(Q˜) + L˜i − λ˜I)
]
+
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
(Q˜i − Qˆi)(ri∇ivi(Qˆ) + Lˆi − λˆI)
]
(14)
50 =
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
(Qˆi − Q˜i)ri∇ivi(Q˜) + (Q˜i − Qˆi)ri∇ivi(Qˆ)
]
+
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
(Qˆi − Q˜i)(L˜i − λ˜I) + (Q˜i − Qˆi)(Lˆi − λˆI)
]
= α+ β. (15)
Re-arranging and evaluating the second term,
β = Tr
[
K∑
i=1
(Q˜i − Qˆi)
{
(λ˜I − L˜i)− (λˆI − Lˆi)
}]
(c)
= Tr
[
K∑
i=1
(λ˜Q˜i − λˆQ˜i + Q˜iLˆi − λ˜Qˆi + QˆiL˜i + λˆQˆi)
]
(d,e)
= λ˜Ptot + λˆPtot − Tr
[
λˆ
∑
i
Q˜i + λ˜
∑
i
Qˆi
]
+ Tr
[∑
i
(Q˜iLˆi + QˆiL˜i)
]
(a)
≥ Tr
[
λˆ
(
Ptot −
∑
i
Q˜i
)]
+ Tr
[
λ˜
(
Ptot −
∑
i
Qˆi
)]
(b)
≥ 0. (16)
We have shown that β ≥ 0 and hence for α+ β = 0 we need
that α ≤ 0. Now
α =
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
(Qˆi − Q˜i)ri∇ivi(Q˜) + (Q˜i − Qˆi)ri∇ivi(Qˆ)
]
= Tr
[
(Qˆ− Q˜)T g(Q˜, r) + (Q˜i − Qˆi)g(Qˆ, r)
]
. (17)
Recognizing that α > 0 is the DSC condition from Definition
5, we arrive at a contradiction as we assume that the DSC
condition is satisfied for the given value of r. Hence, when
the DSC condition is satisfied, the NoE of the GNEP for a
given weight vector r is unique.
Finally, we observe that the DSC condition is one of the
sufficient conditions for determining the uniqueness of NoEs
and there could exist several other sufficient conditions.
III. THE BROADCAST CHANNEL AS A GENERALIZED
NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
Consider a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) BC with
K receivers. The transmitted signal, denoted by xnt×1, where
nt is the number of TX-antennas, is the sum of independent
xi, each drawn from a Gaussian codebook and intended for
the ith receiver (RX): x = ∑Ki=1 xi, xi ∼ N (0, Qi). The
received signal at the ith RX can be expressed as
y
i
= H´ix+ ni, zi ∼ N (0, Ni), (18)
where H´i is the ni × nt channel gain matrix from the TX to
the ith RX and ni is the number of antennas at the ith RX.
Note that this representation is not unique and the received
signal can also be expressed as
y
i
= Hix+ ni, zi ∼ N (0, N0I), (19)
and H´i =
√
N0N
−1/2
i Hi. Both these representations are
used in the paper and the choice of representation will be
indicated based on the context. The signal at each RX is a
linear transformation of the sum of the signals intended for
all the receivers. Without loss of generality, we assume that
TX signaling is constrained by a sum power constraint
Tr
(
E[xxT ]
)
=
K∑
i=1
Tr [Qi] ≤ Ptot,
where Ptot is the maximum transmit sum power for all
the antennas. We begin by assuming that the transmitter
performs dirty paper coding with a fixed encoding order
pi = {K,K − 1, ..., 1}. The rate achieved by the kth receiver,
which is considered as a player in the BC game, can be
expressed as
vk(Qk, Q−k) = log
(
|Nk + H´k(
∑k
i=1Qk)H´
H
k |
|Nk + H´k(
∑k−1
i=1 Qk)H´
H
k |
)
, (20)
or equivalently
vk(Qk, Q−k) = log
(
|N0I +Hk(
∑k
i=1Qk)H
H
k |
|N0I +Hk(
∑k−1
i=1 Qk)H
H
k |
)
. (21)
In this paper, the utility of each player is defined as the
achievable rate under the BC with dirty paper coding and a
given encoding order. Note that vk(Qk, Q−k) is concave in
Qk and continuous in Qi for all i = 1, ...,K . The controlling
variables for the players Qk are coupled via a sum power
constraint which is common to every receiver and hence the
BC game is a GNEP with jointly convex constraints (see
Definition 2).
1) Uniqueness of NoEs: We now examine the existence and
uniqueness of NoEs for the MIMO BC (As noted in Section I,
the set of NoEs and GNEs for the problems considered in this
paper are identical and both terms are used interchangingly to
match the usage in related literature). Uniqueness of NoEs is
a desirable property of a game as it ensures that every player
can accurately predict the outcome of the game and there is
no ambiguity about choosing from a set of equilibria. From
Theorem 3 of Rosen [8], we know that there exists a NoE for a
concave K-person game for every weight vector r > 0. As the
BC game is a concave game with jointly convex constraints,
we immediately conclude that there exists an NoE for every
weight vector r > 0. To analyze the uniqueness of NoEs, we
begin by considering a special class of BCs called aligned and
degraded broadcast channels (ADBCs) [15].
Definition 6: A MIMO BC is aligned and degraded if the
BC is aligned, i.e., nt = n1 = n2 = ... = nK and
H´i = Int×nt and the covariances of the Gaussian noise at
the receiver are ordered such that 0 ≺ N1  N2  ...  NK ,
where A  B implies that B − A is a positive semi-definite
matrix [15].
For an ADBC, the achievable rate or the utility function of
the kth player (from (20)) simplifies to
vADBCk (Qk, Q−k) = log
(
|Nk +
∑k
i=1Qi|
|Nk +
∑k−1
i=1 Qi|
)
. (22)
6We know from Section II that the DSC criterion in Defi-
nition (5) is a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NoE
for a given positive weight vector r. We now determine the
weight vectors r and the encoding orders pi for which the
DSC criterion holds for the ADBC. We first state two trace
inequalities that will be used to derive the uniqueness results.
Lemma 1: [22] For any positive integer K and a set of pos-
itive semi-definite matrices A1, A2, ..., AK and B1, B2, ..., BK
such that A1 ≻ 0 and B1 ≻ 0, we have that
Tr


K∑
k=1
(Ak −Bk)

( k∑
l=1
Bl
)−1
−
(
k∑
l=1
Al
)−1

 ≥ 0.
(23)
Note that the above set of inequalities is not tight in general
and it is possible to derive tighter inequalities in some scenar-
ios. For example, for K = 2 and any positive real number w,
it has been shown in [23] that
Tr[(A1 −B1)(B−11 −A−11 )
+ 4(A2 −B2)
{
(wB1 +B2)
−1 − (wA1 +A2)−1
}
] ≥ 0.
(24)
Theorem 1: For a K-receiver ADBC with dirty paper cod-
ing at the TX and encoding order pi = {K,K − 1, ..., 1}, a
unique NoE achieving strategy exists for every weight vector
r which satisfies r1 ≥ r2 ≥ ... ≥ rK > 0.
Proof: Let (Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜k) and (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., Qˆk) be
any two distinct vectors of covariance matrices which sat-
isfy the sum power constraint:
∑K
i=1 Tr[Q˜i] ≤ Ptot and∑K
i=1 Tr[Qˆi] ≤ Ptot. Substituting the utility function for the
ADBC from (22) in the DSC condition in Definition 5, we get
Tr
[
K∑
k=1
rk(Qˆk − Q˜k)
{
∇kvk(Q˜)−∇kvk(Qˆ)
}]
= Tr
[
K∑
k=1
rk(Qˆk − Q˜k)
{
(Nk +
k∑
i=1
Q˜i)
−1
− (Nk +
k∑
i=1
Qˆi)
−1
}]
=
K−1∑
n=1
(rn − rn+1)Tn + rKTK , (25)
where the term Tn can be expressed as
Tr
[
n∑
k=1
(Qˆk − Q˜k)
{
(Nk +
k∑
i=1
Q˜i)
−1 − (Nk +
k∑
i=1
Qˆi)
−1
}]
.
(26)
Thus proving that Tn > 0 is sufficient to determine the
uniqueness of NoE for every rn ≥ rn+1. Notice that the
structure of Tn closely resembles the inequality in (23). We
choose the quantities A1 = N1 + Q˜1, B1 = N1 + Qˆ1,
Ai = Ni − Ni−1 + Q˜i and Bi = Ni − Ni−1 + Qˆi. By
definition, since N1 is a positive definite matrix and Q˜1, Qˆ1
are positive semi-definite the matrices A1 and B1 are strictly
positive definite. From the degradedness of the channel, we
get that Ni − Ni−1 is a positive semi-definite matrix and
hence Ai and Bi are positive semi-definite for i = 2, ...,K .
Substituting the values of Ai and Bi in (23), it is straight
forward to see that Tn ≥ 0. For an ADBC channel having
identity channel matrices, we know from [5] that if the Q˜ 6= Qˆ,
then Tn > 0 and hence the NoEs of the ADBC game are
unique for r1 ≥ r2... ≥ rK > 0 and encoding order
pi = {K,K − 1, ..., 1}.
It is clear that the weight vectors r for which uniqueness can
be shown are dependent on the tightness of the matrix trace
inequalities. For K = 2, we know from the literature that
the inequality in (23) has been generalized to the inequality
in (24). Using this tighter inequality, we now show that
uniqueness of NoEs for the 2-user ADBC can be determined
for a larger set of vectors. In addition, note that the uniqueness
of NoEs is true only for the specified decoding order and
the weight vectors and the uniqueness of NoEs cannot be
guaranteed for any other decoding order and weight vectors.
Theorem 2: For a 2-user ADBC with dirty paper coding at
the transmitter and interference canceling receivers, a unique
NoE exists for r1 ≥ r2/4 > 0.
Proof: The proof follows exactly on the lines of Theorem
1 with the DSC condition decomposing into two terms given
by (r1 − r24 )T1 and r24 T2. Now using the inequality in (24)
with w = 1, it is easy to show that there exists a unique NoE
for each weight vector which satisfies r1 ≥ r2/4 > 0.
We now consider the uniqueness of NoEs for the general
Gaussian BC. Due to the matrix valued nature of the problem
and the possibility of a null space existing for the channel gain
matrices Hi, we make a distinction between the uniqueness of
NoE achieving strategies and the uniqueness of NoE utility for
the general Gaussian BC. While the former always implies the
later, it is not always true that the uniqueness of NoE utilities
implies the uniqueness of NoE acheiving strategies. From the
derivation of the DSC condition in Proposition 2, we know
that if there exist at least two NoEs, Q˜ = (Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K)
and Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK) for a game with jointly convex
coupled constraints and a given weight vector r, then
K∑
k=1
rkTr
[
(Qˆk − Q˜k)∇kvk(Q˜k) + (Q˜k − Qˆk)∇kvk(Qˆk)
]
= α ≤ 0. (27)
Proposition 3: For a K-receiver BC with dirty paper coding
at the TX and encoding order pi = {pi1, pi2, ..., piK}, a
weight vector r such that rpiK ≥ rpiK−1 ... ≥ rpi1 > 0
and any two feasible strategies Q˜ = (Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K) and
Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK), we have that
K∑
k=1
rkTr
[
(Qˆk − Q˜k)∇kvk(Q˜k) + (Q˜k − Qˆk)∇kvk(Qˆk)
]
= α ≥ 0. (28)
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that pi =
{K,K− 1, ..., 1}. The proof for all the other decoding orders
can be directly obtained by following the procedure shown for
the given decoding order. Consider two K-tuples of covariance
matrices Q˜ = (Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K) and Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK)
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set of functions φk(Q) = (Hk(
∑k
i=1Qi)H
H
k +N0I)
−1, k =
1, ...,K . By re-arranging terms and substituting the utility
function for the BC from (21) in α, we get
K∑
k=1
rkTr
[
(Qˆk − Q˜k)
(
∇kvk(Q˜)−∇kvk(Qˆ)
)]
=
K∑
k=1
rkTr
[
(Qˆk − Q˜k)
(
HHk φk(Q˜)Hk −HHk φk(Qˆ)Hk
)]
=
K∑
k=1
rkTr
[
(Hk(Qˆk − Q˜k)HHk )(φk(Q˜)− φk(Qˆ))
]
=
K−1∑
n=1
(rn − rn+1)Tn + rKTK , (29)
where Tn = Tr
[∑n
k=1Hk(Qˆk − Q˜k)HHk (φk(Q˜)− φk(Qˆ))
]
.
Choose the quantities A1 = N0I + H1Q˜1HHi , B1 =
N0I + H1Qˆ1H
H
1 , Ai = HiQ˜iH
H
i and Bi = HiQˆiHHi .
By definition, as N0I is a positive definite matrix and Q˜1,
Qˆ1 are positive semi-definite, the matrices A1 and B1 are
strictly positive definite. In addition, we see that Ai and
Bi are positive semi-definite matrices for i = 2, ...,K .
Using the trace inequality in Lemma 1 which states that∑N
i=1 Tr
[
(Ai−Bi)×
{
(
∑i
j=1 Bj)
−1− (∑ij=1 Aj)−1}] ≥ 0,
with equality only when Ai = Bi, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N , we see
that Tn ≥ 0 for all n, thus proving the condition in (28).
Theorem 3: The NoE utility of the general Gaussian BC
with a encoding order pi = {piK , piK−1, ..., pi1} is unique for
all weight vectors r such that rpiK ≥ rpiK−1 ... ≥ rpi1 > 0.
However, the NoE achieving strategies (strategy is choice of
Q = (Q1, Q2, ..., Qk)) are not unique in general.
Proof: From (27) and (28), we infer that if Q˜ =
(Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K) and Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK) are two NoEs
(and hence are also achievable strategies), then α = 0. Now
from Proposition 3 we know that
α = 0⇔ Ai = Bi ∀i⇔ HiQ˜iHHi = HiQ˜iHHi . (30)
Substituting in the utility function in (21), we observe that
given a weight vector r such that rpiK ≥ rpiK−1 ≥ ... ≥
rpi1 > 0 and encoding order pi = {piK , piK−1, ..., pi1], the NoE
utility obtained by both the NoE achieving strategies Q˜ and
Qˆ is identical implying the uniqueness of the NoE utility for
a weight vector and its associated encoding order.
If Hi is a square matrix with full rank, it can be easily
shown that HiQ˜iHHi = HiQ˜iHHi implies that Q˜ = Qˆ. In
other words, for a full rank invertible square channel matrix,
the uniqueness of NoE utility also implies the uniqueness of
NoE strategy. However, this is not true for all channel matrices
and hence the NoE achieving strategies for the BC are not
unique in general.
To summarize, we have determined the combinations of
encoding orders and weight vectors for which the NoE utility
for the Gaussian BC is unique. For all other scenarios, the
uniqueness of NoE utility cannot be guaranteed as the DSC
condition from Proposition 2 is only a sufficient condition for
determining the uniqueness of NoEs. For the special case of
an ADBC, we can show that for the encoding order which
achieves the capacity region and a subset of weight vectors
ordered accordingly, the NoE achieving strategy is unique.
IV. THE SUM POWER MAC AS A GENERALIZED NASH
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
The sum power MAC and the BC are closely related
problems in information theory by the duality result derived in
[16]. In particular, it is shown in [16] that the capacity region
of the general Gaussian BC is identical to the capacity region
of a suitably defined MIMO MAC with a joint sum power
constraint across all TXs, in contrast to the individual power
constraints for each TX for a regular MAC. In this section,
we characterize the NoEs of the sum power MAC, which will
enable us to derive a game-theoretic duality between the MAC
and the BC in Section VI of this paper.
A. Signal Model and the Sum Power MAC game
Consider a MIMO MAC channel with K TXs (users) with
the ith TX has ni antennas and a common receiver with nr
antennas. Each transmitted signal is drawn from a Gaussian
codebook xi ∼ N (0, Qi) and transmitted signals satisfy a sum
power constraint given by
∑K
i=1 Tr [Qi] ≤ Ptot. The received
signal y can be written as
y =
K∑
i=1
Hixi + z, (31)
where Hi is nr × ni channel matrix from the ith TX to the
RX and z ∼ N (0, N0I) is the AWGN at the receiver. Each
TX is considered as a player in the game with an action
space that consists of signaling covariance matrices which
satisfy the joint sum power constraint and hence the sum
power MAC game can be modeled as a GNEP. The receiver
performs successive interference cancellation to decode the
signals from each TX and without loss of generality, we
assume that pi = [K,K − 1, ..., 1] is the decoding order. The
utility function for each TX is the rate it obtains and can be
expressed as
vMACk (Qk, Q−k) = log
(
|N0I +
∑k
i=1HiQiH
H
i |
|N0I +
∑k−1
i=1 HiQiH
H
i |
)
(32)
Clearly, the utility function for the kth player (TX) is concave
in Qk and a continuous function of all other variables. In
addition, as the joint sum power constraint defines a convex
set of feasible strategies, the sum power MAC is a concave
game and hence from [8] we know that for every weight vector
r, there exists at least one NoE achieving strategy.
B. Uniqueness of NoEs
In Section III, we determined the uniqueness of NoE
acheiving strategies and utilities for the ADBC and general
Gaussian BCs. Using similar techniques, we now examine the
uniqueness of NoEs for the sum power MAC. As in the case
of the BC, we make a distinction between the uniqueness of
8NoE acheiving strategies and the uniqueness of NoE utilities
for the sum power MAC.
Proposition 4: For the sum power MAC with a successive
interference canceling receiver implementing a decoding order
of pi = {pi1, pi2, ..., piK}, a weight vector r such that rpiK ≥
rpiK−1 ≥ ... ≥ rpi1 > 0 and any two feasible strategies Q˜ =
(Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K) and Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK), we have that
K∑
k=1
rkTr
[
(Qˆk − Q˜k)∇kvk(Q˜k) + (Q˜k − Qˆk)∇kvk(Qˆk)
]
= α ≥ 0. (33)
Proof: The proof of this Proposition follows on the
same lines as the proof of Proposition 3 with φk(Q) =
(
∑k
i=1HiQiH
H
i +N0I)
−1 and is omitted for brevity.
Theorem 4: The NoE utility of the sum power MAC with
a decoding order pi = {pi1, pi2, ..., piK} is unique for all
weight vectors r such that rpiK ≥ rpiK−1 ... ≥ rpi1 > 0.
However, the NoE achieving strategies (strategy is choice of
Q = (Q1, Q2, ..., Qk)) are not unique in general.
Proof: We know from the DSC condition in Proposition
2 that if there exist two NoEs, Q˜ = (Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K) and
Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK) for a game with jointly convex coupled
constraints and a given weight vector r, then
K∑
k=1
rkTr
[
(Qˆk − Q˜k)∇kvk(Q˜k) + (Q˜k − Qˆk)∇kvk(Qˆk)
]
= α ≤ 0. (34)
Now from (4) and the above condition, we infer that if Q˜ =
(Q˜1, Q˜2, ..., Q˜K) and Qˆ = (Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ..., QˆK) are two NoEs
for a given weight vector r (and hence are also achievable
strategies), then α = 0. Now from Proposition 4 we know
that
α = 0⇔ Ai = Bi ∀i⇔ HiQ˜iHHi = HiQ˜iHHi . (35)
Substituting in the utility function in (32), we observe that
given a decoding order pi = {pi1, pi2, ..., piK} and weight vector
r such that rpiK ≥ rpiK−1 ... ≥ rpi1 > 0, the NoE utility
obtained by both the NoE achieving strategies Q˜ and Qˆ is
identical implying the uniqueness of the NoE utility for a
weight vector and its associated decoding order.
Similar to the general Gaussian BC, we observe that if Hi
is a square matrix with full rank, it can be easily shown that
HiQ˜iH
H
i = HiQ˜iH
H
i implies that Q˜ = Qˆ. In other words,
for a full rank invertible square channel matrix, the uniqueness
of NoE utility also implies the uniqueness of NoE achieving
strategies. However, this is not true for all channel matrices
and hence the NoE achieving strategies for the sum power
MAC are not unique in general.
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOES AND PARETO OPTIMAL
SOLUTIONS
In this section, we explore the relationship between the
points on the Pareto-optimal boundary of the rate region of the
BC and sum power MAC and the NoEs of the corresponding
games. This is a necessary precursor towards establishing our
duality result. In specific, we are interested in Pareto-efficient
NoEs, i.e., equilibria which also maximize a weighted sum
of utilities. If a rate point of the BC or sum power MAC
is both Pareto-efficient and an NoE, then it is a socially
optimum solution with self-enforcing properties and enables
the implementation of optimal centralized solutions using
distriubted and decentralized algorithms.
To determine Pareto-efficient NoEs, we first derive a relation
between the weights γ which characterize a given Pareto-
optimal solution and the weights r for which this rate point
is a NoE utility [20]. We generalize the procedure in [20] to
K-players and matrix valued strategies to derive the desired
relationship.
A. Pareto-Efficiency First Order Conditions
Consider a regulator (for example, a base station or a coordi-
nating entity) who would like to control the rates achievable by
each user. The regulator would like choose a feasible strategy
to optimize a weighted sum rate of utility functions. Let F
denote the set of all K-tuples of covariance matrices which
satisfy the sum power constraint. The regulator’s problem can
be written as
max
Q∈F
K∑
i=1
γivi(Qi, Q−i), (36)
where vi is the utility function and γi is the weight attached
to the ith player. We assume that the regulator is interested in
solutions which saturate the constraint
∑K
i=1 Tr[Qi] ≤ Ptot.
The Lagrangian for the regulator w.r.t the common constraint
can be written as
LP =
K∑
i=1
γivi(Qi, Q−i)−µ
[
K∑
i=1
Tr[Qi]− Ptot
]
+
K∑
i=1
Tr [LiQi] ,
(37)
where µ > 0 and Li  0 are the dual variables for the
constraints. As the feasible set F is non-empty for Ptot > 0,
the KKT conditions can be written for all k = 1, 2, ...,K as:
∂LP
∂Qk
=
K∑
i=1
γi
∂vi(Qi, Q−i)
∂Qk
− µI + Lk = 0
Lk  0, Tr[LkQk] = 0
µ > 0,
K∑
i=1
Tr [Qi]− Ptot = 0. (38)
Let us denote the Pareto-optimal solution to be Q∗(γ) =
(Q1(γ), ..., QK(γ)) where γ = (γ1, ..., γK)T . Given the
concavity of the utility functions in the users’ control variable
and convexity of the constraint set, the above conditions are
sufficient for the solution of the differential equations to be
Pareto-optimal.
B. Rosen’s equilibrium first order conditions
We know from Section II-B that it is possible to con-
trol players, who share a common constraint, to satisfy this
constraint by interpreting the GNEP as a modified Nash
9equilibrium problem with penalties for violating the com-
mon constraint. Mathematically, the regulator seeks a solution
which is the NE of the modified game. The Lagrangian of the
optimization associated with each player can be written as
LRk = rkvk(Qk, Q−k)− λ
[
K∑
i=1
Tr[Qi]− Ptot
]
+ Tr [MkQk] ,
(39)
where λ and Mk are the dual variables for the constraints. Note
that the factor λ is equal for all players as we are interested in
NoE where the shadow price ( λri is the true price, see Section
II) of the common constraint are equal for all players. Now,
a set of strategies Qˆ(r) = (Q1(r), ..., QK(r)) is a NoE if it
satisfies the first order conditions for all k = 1, 2, ...,K:
∂LRk
∂Qk
= rk
∂vk(Qk, Q−k)
∂Qk
− λI +Mk = 0
Mk  0, Tr[MkQk] = 0
λ > 0,
K∑
i=1
Tr [Qi]− Ptot = 0. (40)
C. Relation between Pareto-optimal and NoE solutions
Now we derive the relation between γ and r such that
the solutions from obtained from the KKT conditions for
the Pareto-optimal problem and the equilibrium problem are
identical, i.e., Q∗(γ) = Qˆ(r). Let us first consider the simple
case when Q∗k 6= 0nt×nt for all k = 1, 2, ...,K . Defining
η = µλ and manipulating the KKT conditions, we see that for
each k = 1, 2, ...,K ,
ηrkTr
[
∂vk(Qk, Q−k)
∂Qk
Qk
]
=
K∑
i=1
γiTr
[
∂vi(Qi, Q−i)
∂Qk
Qk
]
.
(41)
Let us define bk = rk Tr
[
∂vk(Qk,Q−k)
∂Qk
Qk
]∣∣∣
Q∗
, b =
(b1, b2, ..., bk)
T and the elements of matrix A as Aki =
Tr
[
∂vi(Qi,Q−i)
∂Qk
Qk
]∣∣∣
Q∗
. The above condition can be com-
pactly written as ηb = Aγ. As the weights ri are relative
to each other, we assign rK = 1 to constrain our problem.
Assuming that γ and Q∗ are known, we can solve for
r1, r2, ..., rK−1, η.
Example 1: For the ADBC, evaluating the elements of A,
we get
Aki =


Tr
[
(Q1 + ...+Qk +Nk)
−1Qk
]
if k = i
Tr[((Q1 + ...+Qi +Ni)−1−
(Q1 + ...+Qi−1 +Ni)
−1)Qk] if k < i
0 if k > i
(42)
For the regime of γ in which Q∗k 6= 0nt×nt for all k, it
is clear from (42) that A is an upper-triangular matrix with
positive diagonal elements and negative-off diagonal elements.
Clearly, the structure of the diagonal and off-diagonal elements
ensures that the inverse of the matrix is upper-triangular with
all non-negative elements and hence for every weight vector r,
we can derive the set of weights γ which results in the same
Q∗. This shows that every equilibrium point of the ADBC is
Pareto-optimal.
Now, let us consider the scenario in which Q∗k = 0nt×nt
for some k. This implies that no transmission is scheduled for
the kth user and this user does not enter the game for the
considered value of γ. In addition, we note that (41) reduces
to the trivial equation 0 = 0. For such a scenario, we define a
new BC with K−1 users by eliminating the kth user. Clearly,
the newly defined BC is an ADBC with Q∗i 6= 0, ∀i and hence
the above procedure can be used to find the weights to enforce
the Pareto-optimal solution. If all the players except one have
Q∗i = 0nt×nt we have only one player remaining and the
problem reduces to a degenerate game.
Similarly, exploiting the structure of the utility functions in
(21) and (32) (DPC encoding for the BC and SIC for the sum
power MAC), it can be shown that for the general Gaussian
BC and the sum power MAC, the equilibria corresponding to
a given decoding order lie on the Pareto-optimal boundary of
the rate region achievable by that particular encoding/decoding
order. We formalize the above discussion into the following
theorem.
Theorem 5: Every NoE of a BC and sum power MAC,
given the corresponding encoding/decoding order, lie on the
Pareto-optimal boundary of the achievable rate region corre-
sponding to that given encoding/decoding order.
D. Discussion
• When the control variables of each player are scalars (and
not matrices), the condition in (41) reduces to
ηrk
∂vk(Qk, Q−k)
∂Qk
=
K∑
i=1
γi
∂vi(Qi, Q−i)
∂Qk
. (43)
The above condition for the two-player game with scalar
control variables has been derived in [20] by computing
the Lagrangian only w.r.t the common constraints and
ignores the individual constraints on the control variables.
While ignoring the individual constraints appears to give
the same condition for the scalar scenario, we note that
individual constraints can not be ignored in general.
• The similarity between the equilibrium characterization
for the BC and the sum power MAC suggests that there
exists a game-theoretic duality between the MAC and the
BC, which we formalize in the rest of the paper.
E. Two user Example
We consider a two-user single antenna ADBC to illustrate
the solution and provide some insights into the relation be-
tween the weights characterizing equilibria and Pareto-optimal
solutions. For a two-user one-antenna ADBC (nt = n1 =
... = nK = 1) with Qk representing the power allocated
(instead of a covariance matrix) to the kth user. Assuming
N1 < N2, the Pareto-optimal utility for the first and second
users is given as v1(Q1, Q2) = log(Q1 +N1)− log(N1) and
v2(Q1, Q2) = log(Q1+Q2+N2)− log(Q1+N2) respectively
with Q1 +Q2 = Ptot where Ptot is the total power available
at the transmitter. Substituting the utility functions in (41), the
relation between the two sets of weights can be derived as:
γ1
γ2
=
r1
r2
+
(Q1 +N1)(Q2)
(Q1 +Q2 +N2)(Q1 +N2)
. (44)
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Fig. 1. Plot showing the Pareto optimal frontier for a 2-user ADBC and
several normalized equilibrium points
Fig. 1 shows the Pareto-frontier for the 2-user ADBC with
Ptot = 10, N1 = 1 and N2 = 3 respectively. We first note that
each point not on the axes of this curve can be characterized
by a unique value of γ. However several weight vectors result
in the same Pareto-optimal boundary when this point is on
the axes. For example, all γ1 ∈ [11/24, 1] result in the same
Pareto-optimal point (v1, v2) = (2.4, 0).
In Fig.1, the rate tuples for γ1 = 0.41 and γ1 = 0.375
are marked and given by (v1, v2) = (1.5, 0.7) and (v1, v2) =
(0.4, 1.3) respectively. Using (44), we can show that these
correspond to a r1/r2 = 0.35 and r1/r2 = 0.11 respectively.
From Proposition 1, we infer that the the equilibrium point
r1/r2 = 0.35 > 0.25 is the unique NoE of the game
for γ1 = 0.41. Thus, a regulator can use these weights
to enforce the equilibrium rate (1.5, 0.7) using the taxation
method described in Section II. In contrast, we see that for
the rate tuple corresponding to r1/r2 = 0.11 < 0.25, the
corresponding NoE may not be a unique one. Finally, for
(v1, v2) = (2.4, 0), we note that there is one active player
and hence is a degenerate game. However, using (44), we
see that by choosing any ratio r1/r2 = γ1/γ2 > 11/13 the
regulator can try to impose the fact that only the stronger user
is allocated all the power for this game.
VI. GAME THEORETIC DUALITY BETWEEN MAC AND BC
In this section, we establish a game-theoretic duality be-
tween the MAC and BC by exploiting the properties of the
signal transformation developed for the information theoretic
duality in [16]. We believe that such a transformation can
provide new techniques for the computation of GNEs and
NoEs for the GNEP. We begin by establishing the relationship
between the equilibria of the MAC and the sum power MAC
by exploring the relationship between an NEP and a suitably
defined GNEP.
A. Relationships between NEP and GNEPs
Let P be the total power available to all the users in
a system. Define a NEP with K players, utility functions
Fig. 2. Figure showing the relationship between the equilibria for (N1) and
(G1) for scalar valued strategies in a 2 player game.
vk(Qk, Q−k) such that vk is concave in Qk and continuous in
Q−k, and the feasible strategy of each player as given below
(Note that the presentation of this section, while tuned towards
showing a duality between MAC and BC, can be extended to
constraints and utility functions of a more general nature).
(N1) argmax
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k)
Qk  0, Tr[Qk] ≤ Pk. (45)
In addition, we consider NEPs for which the power constraints
satisfy the condition
∑K
k=1 Pk = P . Note that this constraint
is not inherent to the NEP. It just signifies the fact that we are
interested in all such NEPs whose individual power constraints
for each player sum up to P .
Let us now define a GNEP which is very closely related to
(N1).
(G1) argmax
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k)
Qk  0,
K∑
k=1
Tr[Qk] ≤ P. (46)
Observe that (G1) is a GNEP with jointly convex constraints.
Clearly, both the games (N1) and (G1) have the same number
of players, with each player having the same utility function.
The key difference between the two problems is that while the
strategy set of each player is independent of the strategies of
other players for (N1), they are dependent on the strategies of
other players from (G1). In addition, we note that the feasible
set of (N1) is always a subset of the feasible set of (G1). We
now discuss the relationship between GNEs of (G1) and the
NEs of (N1).
Proposition 5: A vector of strategies Q∗ is a GNE of (G1)
if and only if Q∗ is a NE of all problems (N1) for which Q∗
is in the feasible set of strategies.
In other words, consider all the NEPs for which Q∗ is a
member of the set of strategies, i.e., Tr[Q∗k] ≤ Pk with the
exogenous constraint that
∑K
k=1 Pk = P . Then Q∗ is a NE
for all such NEPs if and only if Q∗ is a GNE of (G1).
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Proof: Let us begin by assuming that Q∗ is a GNE of
the jointly convex GNEP defined by (G1). Then,
vk(Q
∗
k, Q
∗
−k) ≥ vk(Qk, Q∗−k), (47)
for all Qk ∈ Ψk(Q−k). Now let (P ′1, P
′
2, ..., P
′
K) be a vector
such that 0 ≤ Tr[Q∗k] ≤ P
′
k with
∑K
k=1 P
′
k = P and consider
the NEP:
(N2) argmax
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k)
Qk  0, Tr[Qk] ≤ P ′k. (48)
It is straightforward to observe that the feasible set of (N2)
is a subset of the feasible set of (G1). Using the fact that Q∗
is a GNE of (G1), it is easy to observe that
vk(Q
∗
k, Q
∗
−k) ≥ vk(Qk, Q∗−k), ∀ 0 ≤ Tr[Qk] ≤ P
′
k, (49)
and hence Q∗ is a NE of (N2). As the vector (P ′1, P
′
2, ..., P
′
K)
has been chosen arbitrarily, it is clear that if Q∗ is a GNE of
(G1) it is also a NE for all NEPs (N1) for which it is a
member of the feasible set.
Next, we assume that Q∗ is a NE of all the problems of the
type (N1) for which it is an element of the feasible set and
suppose that Q∗ is not a GNE of (G1). Then, there exists a
m and Q˜m such that
vm(Q
∗
m, Q
∗
−m) < vm(Q˜m, Q
∗
−m). (50)
Let Tr[Q˜m] = P˜ . Now, consider a vector of the form
(P
′
1, ...P
′
m−1, P˜ , P
′
m+1, ..., P
′
K) such that
∑K
k=1,k 6=m P
′
k +
P˜ = P and a NEP given by
(N3) argmax
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k)
Qk  0, Tr[Qk] ≤ P ′k, k 6= m
Qk  0, Tr[Qm] ≤ P˜ (51)
As the feasible set of (N3) is a subset of the feasible set of
(G1), it is clear that
vm(Q
∗
m, Q
∗
−m) < vm(Q˜m, Q
∗
−m). (52)
for (N3). This contradicts the fact that Q∗ is a NE of any
problem of type (N1) for which it is a member of the feasible
set and proves the proposition.
Proposition 6: If for every positive weight vector α =
(α1, α2, ..., αK), Q
∗ is a GNE for a GNEP of the form,
(G2) argmax
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k)
Qk  0,
K∑
k=1
Tr[Qk]
αk
≤
K∑
k=1
Pk
αk
, (53)
then Q∗ is a NEP of (N1).
Proof: Define (G3) which contains the common feasible
set of all the GNEPs for every value of α:
(G3) argmax
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k), Qk  0
⋃
α>0
{
K∑
k=1
Tr[Qk]
αk
≤
K∑
k=1
Pk
αk
}
. (54)
Fig. 3. Figure showing the relationship between the equilibria for (N1) and
(G2) for scalar valued strategies in a 2 player game.
We first note that the feasible set of (G3) is an intersection of
infinitely many convex sets and hence is a convex set itself.
Clearly, (G3) is jointly convex. It can be easily shown that the
feasible set of (G3) is identical to the feasible of (N1). Thus,
we observe that if Q∗ is a GNEP of the (G3) for every α,
then Q∗ is also a GNEP to (N1) as both the games have the
same utility functions for the players and the same feasible
sets.
We now utilize the relationship between the equilibria
of (G1) and (N1) to first derive the relation between the
equilibria of the MAC and the sum power MAC. Substituting
the utility functions vk(Qk, Q−k) from (32) in (N1) and (G1),
we infer from Proposition 5 that every GNE of the sum power
MAC is also a NE of a MAC with appropriately defined power
constraints. From Proposition 6, we then infer that every NE of
a MAC is also a GNE of all scaled sum power MACs (where
the feasible set scaling is as discussed in Proposition 6). Thus,
we have established a relationship between the Nash equilibria
of a MAC and the generalized Nash equilibria of a sum power
MAC. Note that this result is true for any given decoding order
and hence applies to all possible decoding orders. As a next
step towards deriving the duality between the MAC and the
BC, we now investigate the properties of GNEs when GNEPs
are transformed using a special linear transformation.
B. Relationship between two different GNEPs
The information theoretic duality between the MAC and the
BC [16] is based on a transformation from the variables from
the sum power MAC to the BC (and vice versa) such that the
utilities are preserved with the transformation (see Equations
(11) and (15) in [16] for the transformation equation). We now
explore the relationship between the equilibria of two GNEPs
related by a similar linear transformation.
Proposition 7: Let us consider two GNEPs (G4) and (G5)
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defined as follows:
(G4) argmax
Qk
vk(Qk, Q−k)
Qk  0,
K∑
k=1
Tr[Qk] ≤ P, (55)
(G5) argmax
Sk
uk(Sk, S−k)
Sk  0,
K∑
k=1
Tr[Sk] ≤ P, (56)
and satisfying the following properties.
• vk is concave in Qk and continuous in Qi for all i =
1, ...,K .
• uk is concave in Sk and continuous in Si for all i =
1, ...,K .
• There exist matrices Ak, Bk independent of Qk and Sk
(but may depend on Q−k and S−k) such that for the linear
transformations Sk = AkQkAHk and Qk = BkSkBHk , we
have that vk(Qk, Q−k) = uk(Sk, S−k) and
•
∑K
k=1 Tr(AkQkA
H
k ) ≤ P and
∑K
k=1 Tr(BkSkB
H
k ) ≤ P .
Then, Q∗ is a GNE of (G4) if and only if S∗, whose kth
component is given as S∗k = AkQ∗kAHk , is a GNE of (G5) and
S∗ is a GNE of (G5) if and only if Q∗, whose kth component
is given as Q∗k = BkS∗kBHk , is a GNE of (G4). In addition,
the utility at equilibrium for both the games is identical, i.e.,
vk(Q
∗
k, Q
∗
−k) = uk(S
∗
k , S
∗
−k).
Proof: We begin by assuming that Q∗ is a GNE of
(G4). As Q∗ is a GNE of a jointly convex game with utility
vk(Qk, Q−k), we have that
Tr
[
∂vk
∂Qk
|Q∗(Qk −Q∗k)
]
≥ 0, (57)
for all k = 1, 2, ...,K and all feasible Qk. Now, using the fact
that Qk = BkSkBHk , we have that
qk,ij =
∑
m,n
bk,imsk,mnb
∗
k,jn. (58)
Differentiating with respect to smn, we have that ∂qk,ij∂sk,mn =
bk,imb
∗
k,jn. Now using the fact that vk(Qk, Q−k) =
uk(Sk, S−k) and that Qk can be expressed as a linear function
of Sk, we have that
∂uk
∂sk,mn
=
∂vk
∂sk,mn
=
∑
i,j
∂vk
∂qk,ij
∂qk,ij
∂sk,mn
=
∑
i,j
∂vk
∂qk,ij
bk,imb
∗
k,jn
= [b∗1n b
∗
2n . . .]


∂vk
∂qk,11
∂vk
∂qk,21
...
∂vk
∂qk,12
∂vk
∂qk,22
...
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.


︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂vk
∂Qk

 bk,1mbk,2m
.
.
.


(59)
Consolidating the above series of equations into a matrix, we
get
∂uk
∂Sk
= BHk
∂vk
∂Qk
Bk. (60)
Now using the fact that Q∗ is a GNE of (G4), for all k =
1, 2, . . . ,K , we have that
Tr
[
∂uk
∂Sk
|S∗(Sk − S∗k)
]
≥ 0,
⇔ Tr
[
BHk
∂vk
∂Qk
|Q∗Bk(Qk −Q∗k)
]
≥ 0,
⇔ Tr
[
∂vk
∂Qk
|Q∗(Qk −Q∗k)
]
≥ 0. (61)
This implies that if Q∗ is a GNE of (G4), then S∗ is a GNE
of (G5). The converse can be shown in a similar manner, thus
completing the proof.
Proposition 7 shows that for any two GNEPs which satisfy
the given properties, the GNEs and the achieved utilities
are identical. In other words, this provides a technique to
transform one GNEP to another that might permit simpler
analysis.
C. Game based MAC-BC duality
We now present a game-theory based dual relationship
between the MAC and the BC. To this end, we first establish
a relationship between the equilibria of the MAC and the sum
power MAC and then connect the equilibria of the sum power
MAC to the BC.
Relationship between MAC and sum power MAC: Let us
first substitute the utility functions for the MAC from (32) in
Prop. 5 which relates the GNEs of a GNEP to the NEs of a
appropriately defined NEP. More precisely, Prop. 5 states that
a vector of strategies Q∗ is a GNE of the sum power MAC if
and only if Q∗ is an NE for all MACs for which Q∗ is part
of the feasible set of strategies.
Now consider a MAC in which the kth player has a power
constraint Tr[Qk] ≤ Pk. We know from [10] that the NE is
achieved at Tr[Qk] = Pk. In other words, given a decoding
order for the transmitters, the NE strategy of the MAC is to
transmit at the highest power. It is easy to see that Q∗ is a
point on the line
∑K
k=1 Tr[Qk] = P and thus is not a member
of the feasible set of strategies for any other problem of type
(N1) with (P ′1, ..., P
′
K) 6= (P1, P2, ..., PK) (see Fig. 2). Q∗ is
thus an NE for all problems of type (N1) for which it is a
member of the feasible set of strategies. Thus from Proposition
5, we infer that Q∗ is also a GNE of the sum power MAC.
This gives our first result which states that the GNEs of a
sum power MAC can be constructed from the NEs of all the
MACs which satisfy the exogenous power constraint of the
sum power MAC.
Next we consider a GNE Q∗ of the sum power MAC. From
Theorem 5 in Section V, we know that Q∗ achieves a point
of the Pareto-boundary of the rate region for the sum power
MAC. Using Prop. 5 it is easy to see that Q∗ also an NE for
the MAC with individual power constraints given by P ∗k =
Tr[Qk]. To summarize, we have now shown that the set of
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GNEs of a sum power MAC is the union of the set of NEs of
the corresponding MACs.
Finally, Prop. 6 shows that if Q∗ is a GNE for all sum
power MACs which satisfy power constraints of the form∑K
k=1
Tr[Qk]
αk
≤ Pkαk for every positive weight vector α, then
Q∗ is a NE of a MAC. In other words, the set of NEs of a MAC
are the intersection of the set of all GNEs of corresponding
sum power MACs.
Relationship between sum power MAC and BC: Let us
consider Prop. 7 which provides for a way to transform
one GNEP to another and relates the GNEs of such trans-
formed GNEPs. We use this transformation to establish the
relationship between the GNEs of the sum power MAC and
the BC. Let vk and uk be the utility functions of the sum
power MAC and the BC respectively. From equations (11) and
(15) of [16], we know that there exist linear transformations
Sk = AkQkA
H
k and Qk = BkSkBHk , with Ak and Bk
independent of Qk and Sk respectively, satisfying the power
constraints, and which transform the utility function of the
sum power MAC (same as the utility function for the MAC)
into the utility function of the BC. Thus, from Proposition 7,
it is clear that for every GNE of the sum power MAC there
exists an GNE of the BC and vice versa.
Now combining the results from Propositions 5 and 7, we
can infer that for every equilibrium point of the MAC there
exists an equilibrium point of the BC and vice versa. We
summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: For a given decoding order for a MAC (and
corresponding encoding for the BC), the set of all NEs of the
MAC is the set of all GNEs common to the corresponding (as
defined in (G2) and (G3) ) BCs and the set of all GNEs of
the BC is the union of the set of NEs of the corresponding
(as defined in (N1) and (N2)) MAC. In other words, the
equilibrium rate regions of the MAC and the BC are identical.
This duality allows us to easily find the GNEs of the BC
providing a method to transform the equilibria of the MAC
to the BC. In general, a game-theoretic duality between the
MAC and the BC could be potentially extended to the scenario
with multiple constraints at the transmitter and allow for the
translation of several equilibrium results for the MAC to the
BC.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a game theoretic model for
the Gaussian BC and a related problem, the MAC channel
with sum power constraints. By modeling both scenarios as a
generalized Nash equilibrium problems, we characterized the
existence and uniqueness of normalized equilibrium achieving
strategies and utilities. We then proposed a characterization
for Pareto-efficient equilibria and show that every point on
the Pareto-optimal boundary of the BC and sum power MAC
for a given decoding order is a normalized equilibrium cor-
responding to a defined parametrization. Using the proposed
characterization, a regulator can implement a desired Pareto-
optimal solution as the solution to the game between receivers
for the broadcast channel and transmitters for the sum power
MAC. Next, we establish a several relationships between the
equilibria of the MAC, sum power MAC and the BC and
derive a game-theoretic duality between the MAC and the BC
which shows that for a given decoding/encoding order, the
equilibria of the sum power MAC and the BC are identical.
Thus, the equilibrium rate region of the MAC is identical to
the equilibrium rate region of the BC, thus demonstrating a
information theory based technique to evaluate the GNEs of
the BC.
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